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Misleading: That [which] leads someone astray, 
or causes someone to have an incorrect impression 
or belief; deceptive, delusive. (Oxford English 
Dictionary, online edition)
Introduction
Large statistical studies in the social sciences, including 
one-off or repeated cross-sectional surveys, time-series 
surveys and cohort longitudinal research, offer important 
numeric evidence for policy making. Although single 
studies rarely occasion dramatic policy shifts, statistical 
research findings can affect policy debate, even if not 
always directly or openly. At best, these studies reveal 
shapes and patterns in the social fabric relevant to health, 
safety, education and other social goals. Numerical 
measures of many social phenomena, such as unreported 
crime, illicit drug use, child-rearing practices or family 
composition, enter into a policy-making milieu crowded 
with competing numbers and qualitative information, 
as well as non-evidential values and power-based 
influences.
Statistical studies can cost millions, and draw significantly 
from modest research budgets. By one estimate, 39 
public sector organisations planned to spend $87.4 
million on policy research in 2006/7 (MoRST, 2007). I 
have been told that a longitudinal study of New Zealand 
children and families, under development by a group 
led from the University of Auckland and the Ministry 
of Social Development, would likely have annual costs 
ranging from $2 million to $6 million or more. Getting 
the most public value from costly statistical research 
depends on how well researchers design their studies, 
and on how accurately and effectively they analyse and 
convey their findings to decision makers. In the process, 
the researchers themselves, academic and technical 
critics, the media, the public and government officials 
all interpret and apply numbers with more or less skill, 
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fortitude and scepticism. Accordingly, Joel Best, in his 
Damned Lies and Statistics, reminds us not to avoid 
statistics but to become ‘better judges of the numbers 
we encounter’ (Best, 2001, p.6). Better judgement 
means fewer misinterpretations of numbers, and ought, 
therefore, to result in fewer misapplications of numbers 
for policy purposes. 
In this article, I leave aside misinterpretation and 
misuse of statistics, and their onus upon the ‘consumer’. 
Instead, I consider residual and insidious determinants 
of the public value of statistics: the ways in which good 
numbers, produced and reported by respected, unbiased, 
technically acclaimed researchers, may nevertheless 
mislead key actors in the policy debate. Misleading 
numbers can flourish even in the absence of sloppiness, 
self-interest or malign intent by a producer or advocate 
of numbers (matters which are well-addressed by Best). 
In the policy debate, a badly interpreted or misused 
number may be better than no number at all, because 
it can stimulate correction. But a misleading number 
may become embedded in the policy milieu with no 
further scrutiny. The less misleading a number is, the 
less will be the collateral damage from misinterpretation 
and misuse. 
A comprehensive treatment of misleading statistics would 
require struggling through some roiling epistemological 
waters. Instead, the following briefly serves my purposes: 
no statistic perfectly reflects either the natural context 
of individuals and societies or changes in that reality. 
Rather, a statistic expresses the probability that a 
measurable quantity in a particular situation is really 
the case. ‘Reality’, or ‘truth’, has some qualities that 
may be known to an observer, but never beyond the 
shadow of doubt. At best, statistical observations are 
guesses. Therefore, even the best measures of reality may 
mislead, may cause the observer to have an incorrect 
belief about the truth. Statisticians have developed some 
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sophisticated techniques to minimise the proliferation 
of misleading numbers, and to accurately convey the 
uncertainty of numbers. Yet, outside their circle, among 
those who commission, fund and communicate research 
activities, this sophistication is often lost. Because no 
number exists in a vacuum, numbers can mislead if their 
initial presentation confuses people, or suggests wrong 
inferences to them. 
In this article, I identify and illustrate several instances of 
misleading statistics, drawing upon four recent studies. I 
focus particularly on statistics used to ‘explain’ outcomes 
and to draw conclusions from comparative assessments. 
Such statistics attract keen scrutiny in government-
sponsored research, especially when variables are tracked 
over time. Two of the four are products of New Zealand’s 
acclaimed longitudinal studies. One links abortion 
to mental health outcomes (Fergusson, Horwood & 
Ridder, 2006), and the other claims an association 
between work-related stress and depression and anxiety 
(University of Otago, 2007). The other studies are 
cross-sectional surveys. I selected reputable non-New 
Zealand studies that attracted entirely positive media 
attention: a study on the IQ advantages of first-borns, 
reported in Science (Kristensen & Bjerkedal, 2007), 
and a US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
survey that shows that men have more sex partners than 
women (Fryar et al., 2007). 
All four are examples of large-scale, multi-million dollar, 
policy-relevant research. Some doubt that such studies 
actually do affect policy. But if they do not, one must 
query why not, given the resources invested. Frequently, 
of course, researchers seeking government funds must 
promise policy relevance. Perhaps understandably, 
they face incentives to assert more certainty in the 
evidence than is warranted. They are reluctant to note 
caveats. Within government departments, research is 
commissioned to investigate important social variables. 
Here, too, the incentives to collect and assess data with 
the highest policy relevance can, counter-intuitively, 
result in blind spots in the evidence base. I intend no 
critique of most of the measuring, categorising and 
analysing undertaken in the production and use of 
official statistics: these are nourishing waves replenishing 
our knowledge base.
The need to appreciate the causes of misleading 
statistics and to ameliorate their toll is especially 
acute for New Zealand. Large-scale statistical studies 
are costly financially (even as they are relatively cost-
effective in gathering and assessing masses of data). 
Yet the opportunity costs and flow-on effects may be 
many times more significant for the quality of available 
evidence and, ultimately, for social outcomes. 
Four studies: what misleads and why?
Gina Kolata (2007), in ‘The myth, the math, the sex’, 
reports on a survey of sex practices, done under the 
auspices of the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), in which men claim they have had 
a median of seven partners in their lifetimes, whereas 
women claim four. The median calculations of ‘vaginal, 
oral or anal sex’ partners exclude people with no opposite 
sex partners (Fryer et al., 2007). Kolata quotes David 
Gale, an emeritus professor of mathematics at the 
University of California, Berkeley: ‘Surveys and studies 
to the contrary notwithstanding, the conclusion that 
men have substantially more sex partners than women 
is not and cannot be true for purely logical reasons.’ 
In principle, ‘sex partner’ is an objective, countable 
phenomenon. So, discrepancies in reported totals must 
be due either to gender-specific over- and/or under-
reporting, or to gender-specific differences in the way 
‘sex partner’ is construed. Unfortunately, we don’t know 
the degree to which either happens, nor the underlying 
mechanisms involved in construing and recalling events. 
While the survey design and analysis could be improved 
by better defining terms, or by further disaggregating the 
reported totals, the magnitude of the discrepancy is too 
large to be satisfactorily resolved by such methods. 
Why was manifestly false data published with no reader 
advisory? The scientist’s answer, provided by the study’s 
lead researcher, is that data is what it is; the reasons 
why are not for her to gauge. Another answer, Kolata 
intimates, is that we accept what we expect: ‘[e]veryone 
knows men are promiscuous by nature. It’s part of the 
genetic strategy that evolved to help men spread their 
genes far and wide. The strategy is different for a woman, 
who has to go through so much just to have a baby and 
then nurture it. She is genetically programmed to want 
just one man who will stick with her and help raise their 
children.’ So, the numbers also mislead because they 
reinforce a stereotype, supposedly backed by rigorous 
science. Unfortunately, if policy makers need evidence 
on numbers of lifetime sex partners, this survey comes 
up empty. 
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The survey also collected data on illicit drug use. Should 
these drug-use statistics be used to plan enforcement 
and prevention activities? On the plus side, the data 
do not defy logic in the manner of the sex partner 
data. Against this, might drug users and non-users 
(the very same providers of the distorted sex partner 
data) contribute systematically inaccurate data? Similar 
concerns accompany any study in which the data are 
based on self-reports concerning activities and events 
that are conceptually vague: one person’s recall and 
reporting of ‘sex partner’ or ‘use of drugs’ may not be 
another’s. 
The second illustration mainly avoids the limitations 
of self-reported data. Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) 
find that IQ falls as birth order rises (that is, children 
born second in a family will tend to have lower IQs than 
first-born children, and third-born children will tend 
to have even lower IQs). A younger sibling accrues an 
IQ advantage comparable to a first-born by becoming 
a ‘social first-born’ when an elder sibling dies in infancy. 
The difference amounts to a ‘statistically significant’ 2.3 
IQ points between first- and second-borns. The data 
come from over 240,000 Norwegian 18- and 19-year-
old male conscripts, who took an intelligence test as part 
of compulsory military service between 1985 and 2004. 
All conscripts within the specified period took the same 
test (though the year of conscription was controlled for 
in case the test was, by chance, easier or harder in one 
year than another). 
Frank Sulloway (2007), in a companion comment in 
Science, is convinced 2.3 points matters, and finds a 
way to exemplify it. He writes, ‘if Norway’s educational 
system had only two colleges – a more prestigious 
institution for students with IQs above the mean, and 
a less desirable institution for all other students – an 
eldest child would be about 13% more likely that a 
secondborn to be admitted to the better institution’. 
Another reviewer, Roxanne Khamsi (2007), writes in 
New Scientist, ‘The findings could suggest better ways of 
parenting the youngest children in a family’ to overcome 
the ‘social factors’ that lead to their lower IQs. 
Having assumed the finding’s merits, Sulloway and 
Khamsi (whom I consider knowledgeable media 
exemplars) both fall into the trap of presenting (or 
implying) an explanation that fits, drawing authority 
from theories that do not feature in the study. Sulloway 
refers to a ‘confluence model’, which explains the 
observation that older children tend to have lower IQs 
than younger children when tested as children, but 
then recover their first-born advantage by adulthood. 
The reasoning holds that older children score lower 
when they find themselves in a ‘degraded’ intellectual 
environment when a younger sibling arrives. Later, 
older children shift to the intelligence-enhancing role 
of tutor to the younger sibling. Sulloway admits there is 
little evidence for the tutoring effect. Khamsi, however, 
asserts the possible explanation that parents have more 
time and resources to invest in their first-born, but offers 
no backing for her claim.
Ever since Galton observed in 1874 that first-born sons 
were more likely than chance would predict to attain 
prominent positions, his negative association between 
intelligence and birth order has been confirmed in 
numerous tests using IQ measures. Yet just why this 
is so remained contested. Given no self-reporting bias 
or conceptual ambiguity, and with various statistical 
controls, the Norwegian study claims to support a 
‘family-interaction’ theory rather than a competing 
‘gestation-order’ theory. 
Family interaction is a complex construct. As often 
happens in large statistical studies, the researchers 
adjusted the data, in this case for parental education, 
maternal age at birth, family size, birth weight and year 
of conscription. The report states, ‘Because children 
from families with an adverse reproductive history 
had a less-advantageous distribution on a number 
of factors associated with low IQs, we considered it 
important to adjust for those factors.’ In other words, 
the researchers statistically isolated ‘family interaction’ 
from some family-related events but not others (such 
as time spent with a child or sibling tutoring), to more 
accurately account for the association between birth 
order and IQ. 
As variables, birth order and number of living older 
siblings have a conceptual clarity and precision that IQ 
scores lack. IQ scores are precise (given as 103 or 92, 
for instance), but the score’s relation to ‘intelligence’ is 
not. The measurement of intelligence generally and the 
interaction of intelligence, IQ testing and social factors 
in the home did not feature in the small number of news 
reports and blogs I encountered. Yet Sulloway reports 
a consistent finding that first-borns are perceived as 
‘achievers’ within the family. (Subsequent-borns occupy 
niches such as ‘sporty’ or ‘clown’.) Might niche correlate 
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with test scores? Perhaps first-borns learn to be just a 
tad more serious about completing multiple-choice tests 
well. In short, there might be some other explanation 
that would explain the IQ findings. 
My last two illustrations come from longitudinal cohort 
research. Such studies complement large-scale, one-off 
or repeated-snapshot studies. Rather than measuring 
a few variables in a very large sample, longitudinal 
studies measure a large number of variables a moderate 
number of times in a moderately sized sample. The data 
collection supports a wide range of discrete analyses. 
Hundreds of peer-reviewed papers have appeared from 
New Zealand’s studies. Among these, for example, a 
reviewer of this article points out that a paper linking 
breastfeeding to academic achievement (Horwood & 
Fergusson, 1998) continues to be influential in scientific 
research. (Are first-borns perhaps breastfed longer than 
subsequent-borns?) 
Recent analysis from the Dunedin Multidisciplinary 
Health and Development Study (University of Otago, 
2007), which has followed 1,000 people since their 
birth in 1972/73, finds that ‘work stress precipitates 
depression and anxiety in young working women 
and men’. High psychological demands, such as long 
hours, tight deadlines or pressure from supervisors, 
are associated with clinical depression, anxiety or 
both in women and men. At age 32, 50 women and 
52 men were diagnosed with depression, anxiety or 
both for the first time. Because of the research design, 
researchers claim to have linked workplace stress to 
mental health disorders independently of other factors 
known to predict disorders, such as personality and 
socio-economic status. The misleading potential in this 
case arises from a combination of self-reported data, 
researcher involvement in setting thresholds for defining 
participants in or out of conceptually fuzzy categories, 
and the tendency to abstract selected associations from 
participants’ lived experiences. 
Longitudinal researchers invest considerable time 
gathering and analysing data. At each measurement 
stage, participants provide information and submit to 
tests over the course of a day. Corroborating evidence 
may be sought through a variety of means. Unlike 
numbers of sex partners and IQ scores, workplace 
stress levels and psychiatric disorders must be inferred 
by the researchers from the information reported by 
the subjects or measurements made of them. While 
standardised diagnostic tools assist with identifying 
psychiatric disorders, gauging workplace stress is a 
matter of the researchers’ qualitative interpretations 
of study members’ self-reports. The authors defend 
their work: ‘Other research has shown that self-reports 
of workplace stress are probably more accurate than 
reports by co-workers or supervisors. In the area of 
mental health, individuals’ perceptions of their work 
environment are thought to be especially important.’ 
Yet they also write, ‘workplace stress levels and 
psychiatric disorders were tested at the same time, 
[so] it is possible that depression may have influenced 
the answers given about work characteristics. The 
researchers did control for “negative reporting style” 
to account for this possibility.’ That is, the researchers 
applied their own measure of reporting style to ‘control’ 
for a possible confounding variable. Since only 45% of 
newly diagnosed cases (46 individuals) were directly 
attributable to job demands, the effect of controlling 
for reporting style is ambiguous. What of the remaining 
55%, for whom the ‘association’ between stress and 
depression cannot be directly attributed? What, indeed, 
of the 900 or so others, for whom any workplace stress 
or mental health concerns were judged below relevant 
thresholds, or whose work and mental health profiles 
otherwise differed? Nevertheless, the lead author asserts 
in a press release that ‘[i]n their 30s, most people are 
settling into careers, but it is also a time when people 
are at elevated risk for psychiatric disorders. Putting 
preventive efforts into reducing work stress at that age 
could bring big benefits’ (University of Otago, 2007). 
Clearly, the author is directing readers to draw certain 
inferences from the numbers. But if no one questions 
the inference – are most people in their 30s settling into 
careers? – the numbers, whatever they show, are more 
likely to mislead. 
The Christchurch Health and Development Study, New 
Zealand’s other long-standing longitudinal study, has 
also been following a birth cohort over time. Recently, 
as the study participants reached 25 years of age, 
the researchers investigated various associations with 
abortion. Unlike previous studies, the Christchurch 
study compared women who have abortions with both 
women who had been pregnant but did not have an 
abortion and women who had not been pregnant. 
While adverse mental health effects from abortion 
have been attributed to guilt and unresolved loss, the 
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researchers expected that other (‘third’ or ‘confounding’) 
effects could be associated with both abortion and 
mental health outcomes. They find that ‘those having 
an abortion had elevated rates of subsequent mental 
health problems including depression, anxiety, 
suicidal behaviours and substance use disorders. This 
association persisted after adjustment for confounding 
factors’ (Fergusson et al., 2006). The research adjusts 
for 19 possible confounding socio-economic factors, 
childhood- and family-related factors, and health and 
personality factors. In addition, however, the researchers 
acknowledge a vague category of ‘woman’s circumstances 
at the time of the pregnancy’. The circumstances include 
her age, whether her pregnancy was planned, and the 
stability of her partnership. 
Although the researchers appropriately note possible 
limitations in their study from omitted covariates and 
possible distortions due to respondents’ under-reporting 
abortions, the catch-all ‘circumstances’ category points 
to an additional source of misleading information. 
The authors essentially admit that they do not know 
much about what influenced a woman in their study 
to seek an abortion (or not). Perhaps, they suggest, the 
mental health effects are due to the unwanted pregnancy 
and not to the abortion. No doubt many contextual 
factors, singly and in combination, are linked to mental 
health. In short, if context matters – where context is a 
combination of factors – neither modelling more variables 
nor improving the reporting of abortion incidence will 
add substantially to understanding. 
Minimising misleading statistics
The illustrations together highlight three important 
ways that statistical studies can mislead. First, 
key constructs are open to wide interpretation 
regardless of whether data are self-reported, objectively 
measured and/or researcher-adjusted. Second, initial 
interpretations may overreach due to ambiguity in 
the variables used to measure complex social life. 
Ambiguity may arise from unquestioned consensus, or 
because researchers control for only some alternative 
associations, or because the notionally small step 
between a relatively unambiguous quantitative measure 
and some plausible conclusion actually traverses a 
deep chasm that invalidates the causal logic. Third, 
at the heart of the matter lurks a black box, the fuzzy 
and multi-faceted ‘context’ or ‘personal factors’ or 
‘subjective meaning’, which cast doubt on both simple 
counts and causal explanations. 
Plainly, studies of individual and social outcomes can 
never include all the contributing factors or possible 
explanations. The possibility that statistics will mislead 
cannot be avoided. Where does this leave us? Two recent 
books, one by William Starbuck, a noted management 
thinker with a background in science and engineering 
(2006), and the other a provocative argument by the 
Danish planner/geographer Bent Flyvbjerg (2001), 
struck me as particularly trenchant in their observations 
bearing on the mitigation of misleading statistics. 
Starbuck claims that ‘signals’ and ‘noise’ look remarkably 
similar in statistical studies. Both occur as ‘systemic 
components’ and both vary erratically. While technical 
procedures attempt to distinguish the two, some 
mightily huge assumptions must hold for us to trust 
the results. Yet, instead of presenting hedged claims, 
researchers trumpet ‘statistically significant but 
meaningless noise ... [and] often mistake confounding 
background relationships for theoretically important 
information’ (Starbuck, 2006, pp.47-9).
Moreover, Starbuck claims, ‘knowledge is what people 
say it is .... social processes elevate perceptions into 
facts, convert beliefs into truths’ (2006, p.75). Statistics 
become the truths they estimate: first-borns are clever; 
men do have more sex partners than women. Flyvbjerg, 
however, drawing on Giddens’ ‘double hermeneutic’, 
argues that what is to count as a relevant fact ‘is 
determined by both the researchers’ interpretations and 
by the interpretations of the people whom the researchers 
study’. He follows with the consequent implication: ‘this 
means that the study of society can only be as stable as 
the self-interpretations of the individuals studied. And 
inasmuch as these interpretations are not constant, the 
study of society cannot be stable either’ (2001, p.33): 
we say (for now) that first-borns are clever, we believe 
men have more partners (but ‘sex’ for men is not the 
same as it is for women). 
Starbuck recommends that researchers disturb themselves, 
shake themselves out of their tendency to fall victim 
to poor assumptions. Then, he suggests, they should 
actively experiment, eschewing the classic strategies of 
building on previous research by more finely testing 
existing explanations or searching for something new 
in some overlooked crack in the landscape. 
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As Starbuck sees it, ‘There are many more combinations 
of symptoms than there are diagnoses, so translating 
symptoms into diagnoses discards information. 
Moreover, there are many more treatments than 
diagnoses, so basing treatments on diagnoses injects 
random errors. Doctors can make more dependable 
links between symptoms and treatments if they leave 
diagnoses out of the chain’ (2006, pp.108-9). He 
continues: 
Academic research is trying to follow a model 
like that taught in medical schools. Scientists are 
translating data into theories, and promising to 
develop prescriptions from the theories. Data 
are like symptoms, theories are like diagnoses, 
and prescriptions like treatments ... Theories do 
not capture all the information in data, and they 
do not determine prescriptions uniquely .... The 
systems social scientists are trying to understand 
are very complex and flexible, perhaps too 
complex and flexible for traditional research 
methods that rely on spontaneous data and static 
analyses. (Starbuck, 2006, p.113)
Flyvbjerg adds context back into the picture, not because 
context holds variables that need to be brought under 
analytic control, but because context is interpretively 
meaningful experience: 
The problem in the study of human activity is 
that every attempt at a context-free definition of 
an action, that is, a definition based on abstract 
rules or laws, will not necessarily accord with the 
pragmatic way an action is designed by the actors 
in a concrete social situation. Social scientists 
do not have a theory (rules and laws) for how 
the people they study determine what counts 
as an action ... because theory – by definition – 
presupposes context-independence. (Flyvbjerg, 
2001, p.42)
His prescription, based on Dreyfus’ model of learning, 
reminds researchers that lower-level analytic cognition 
must be complemented by intuition and judgement 
at higher levels. Research must move beyond 
methodological formalism, just as Starbuck’s ‘doctors’ 
should leave diagnoses out of the chain. The goal is 
improved social dialogue on the questions of: Where are 
we going? Is this desirable? Who gains and who loses? 
The whole point, he says, ‘is to enter into a dialogue 
with individuals and society and . . . to make moral 
debate part of public life’ (p.63).
Conclusion
We do not inhabit a 1984 world of immoral policy 
experiment. Nor do we choose to debate morality 
at every turn. Yet public policies, such as legalised 
prostitution or ACC coverage for workplace stress, 
are experiments. Values are close to their core. Policy-
relevant statistical studies provide qualified measures of 
the facts of matters such as sexual practices and causes 
or outcomes of workplace stress. Statistics, and their 
initial presentation, carry with them the possibility 
to mislead. Starbuck and Flyvbjerg offer intelligent, 
complementary strategies that researchers can use (and 
that funders can support) to reduce misleading numbers. 
Researchers can adopt an open and exploratory 
stance by disturbing themselves and actively pursuing 
knowledge through experiment. And they can adopt 
an expert’s stance in judging contextual complexity. In 
the remainder of this article, I offer some suggestions 
along these lines. In the space allowed, I cannot expand 
each to a complete argument, so I must trust readers 
to think laterally from their own perspectives, aided by 
the preceding illustrations. Although the illustrations 
are big, expensive studies, in posing the suggestions I 
have in mind moderately sized studies, achievable by 
small teams.
New Zealand is a small and diverse country, where 
signals can be especially hard to detect in noise: Why 
do families form and dissolve? Are first-born children 
breastfed longer? It is wasteful to sift through masses 
of data and to accumulate associations in the hope that 
some will prove useful. Researchers should design studies 
to search for bigger needles in smaller haystacks. A big 
needle is a finding that is neither empty nor misleading. 
A small haystack is a search field selected according to 
specific criteria by a researcher who knows the contours 
of the social terrain, as well as those of the academic 
terrain. Time and effort are needed in the scoping stages 
of new research to develop and test variables and their 
measurement realistically and to craft focused data 
collection. 
To confront vagueness and ambiguity in the scoping 
phase, researchers should disturb themselves by 
questioning measures of convenience or convention that 
might otherwise clutter a survey; by openly tracking their 
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
4 
20
07
28
assumptions as a way to find alternative measures of their 
main constructs; and by retaining multiple measures, 
not all of which are ‘obvious’, congenial to the researcher 
or even mutually compatible. Qualitative research, 
especially evaluations of prior policy ‘experiments’ and 
investigations of meaning in self-reported data, can 
direct researchers’ attention to the more informative 
variables and associations, including some which will 
not yet have occurred to them. Researchers should 
confidently draw on their own knowledge and expertise, 
because these supply hunches that can help them to 
bridge weaknesses in formalised knowledge.
If richness of variables and measures intensifies, then 
scale may need to be reduced to maintain research 
tractability. Yet, a study with five freshly developed 
variations involving 100 participants each may be 
more informative than a study with 1,000 participants, 
which differs little from previous work. Variations 
can be approached serially, as the successive probes 
of researcher-as-‘experimenter’. Whereas Starbuck’s 
‘experiment’ is tinged with social engineering – he 
favours introducing real changes to observe their effects 
– I adopt an interpretation that implies multiple probes 
of ‘reality’ in order to narrow uncertainty without 
oversimplification.
No number should be allowed to speak for itself. Too 
often we fail to adequately analyse, contextualise and 
interpret the data we collect. Conversely, some data are 
collected that can be only summarised, but not fruitfully 
analysed, in part because New Zealand’s size and diversity 
limit the statistical power of tests. I would like to see 
researchers more actively engaged as expert spokespeople 
for – and against – various plausible interpretations of 
their findings. More surgically precise data collection, 
coupled with greater sophistication in analysis and 
comparison with findings from related research, could 
substitute for an undisciplined tendency to supply 
explanations beyond what the data can support.
Initial interpretations of research findings should be 
far-ranging – what’s new, not new, missing, possible, 
surprising, disturbing, confusing? Findings should be 
examined in light of researchers’ multiple activities to 
combat ambiguity and in light of prevailing ‘truths’. 
Pursuing knowledge through experiment requires 
matching emerging findings to as many different 
situations and possible explanations as possible – what’s 
the same, what’s different? Applying judgement requires 
the researcher to come out from behind an academic 
screen and speak to the public directly: ‘I have immersed 
myself professionally in this field and this is what I see 
in this number.’ Researchers should explicitly address 
prominent ‘myths’ when reporting results and openly 
discuss manifestly questionable data. 
Interpretive ambiguity cannot be addressed at the level 
of semantics or statistics alone. Nor should consensus 
always be expected or demanded. Not every social 
phenomenon has one or a few generalised descriptions 
or causes that can be derived from a few variables. 
Thus, research designs should allow for multiple 
interpretations and draw on different individual and 
social meanings that are developed from a range of 
perspectives, rather than from expert theory alone. What 
level of commitment, or attraction, makes a person a ‘sex 
partner’? What might account for the observation that 
one person avoids depression when a similarly situated 
person does not?
‘Being critical’, says Best, ‘means more than simply 
pointing to the flaws in a statistic’ (2001). In this 
article, I chose examples that contain excellent statistics. 
My aim was to direct attention to ‘flaws’ that mislead 
and that can be addressed by brave and open choices, 
especially at the design and initial reporting stages. Such 
added attention of this sort does not obviate the need 
to improve in other areas: we still need, for instance, 
solid baseline statistics and a more numerate media. 
We still need to counter an overreliance on simplistic 
analysis with both greater technical skill and creative 
qualitative analysis. 
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